This paper shows that the pooling of nancial resources in an internal capital market may magnify nancial distress situations. This eect, which is closely related to the well-known debt overhang phenomenon, arises when there is a illiquidity in one part of the conglomerate, which then spills over to other divisions. This eect is the ip side of the coinsurance function of conglomerates, the leading rationale for internal capital markets. We show that contagion will prevail for very volatile rms, whereas coinsurance is likely to dominate for more stable rms. Taking into account that conglomeration is likely to exacerbate incentive problems in the rm, a non-monotonic relationship between the severity of risk and the preference for conglomeration emerges, where the best and the worst rms prefer to incorporate as stand-alone rms.
1.

Introduction
Many rms maintain diversied activities, or even expand the scope of their operations through acquisitions and other forms of investment, in apparent deance to the disdain that corporate strategists and equity markets have long reserved for conglomerates. Ever since Lang and Stulz (1994) , Berger and Ofek (1995) and Servaes (1996) documented that diversied rms trade at a considerable discount to a comparable portfolio of stand-alone rms, two questions notably about conglomerates have captivated: What explains the nding of a conglomerate discount? And why would rms choose to diversify, when this organizational choice is apparently so little appreciated by the stock markets?
On the rst question, the controversy whether the conglomerate discount is a hard fact or is largely explained by selection bias has been revived by a number of recent critical studies. They present multi-faceted evidence that conglomerate divisions have, on average, signicantly dierent characteristics than comparable stand-alone rms.
1 The conclusion is that conglomerates are not discounted because internal capital markets destroy value, but because poorer performing rms are much more likely to be acquired by a conglomerate than better performing one.
In answering the second question, the most important benet of conglomerates is widely seen in the coinsurance function of internal capital markets: rms can channel the internally generated funds to the most worthy projects; and by combining the divisional cash ows into a smooth aggregate cash ow, rms can raise their debt capacity and enjoy tax benets.
2 In other words, divisions provide insurance for their cash ow risks, which should be particularly valuable in the presence of imperfect capital markets.
The question is then whether conglomerates will make ecient use of the opportunity to pool the nancial resources, or whether they will squander it.
There is some support for the idea that conglomerates will be able to perform winner-picking among their divisions and thus create value. Apart from the debt tax shield, the tax advantage of a stable prot ow arises as governments tax positive income, but do not pay subsidies for negative income. Carryforwards/carrybackwards reduce, but do not entirely eliminate, this distortion (Majd and Myers (1987) ). 3. Gertner et.al. (1994) , Stein (1997) , Fluck and Lynch (1999) , Gautier and Heider (2001) and Inderst and Mueller (2001) argue *for this claim*.
ingly, hierarchical decision-making and increased conicts are seen as major impediments to an ecient allocation of funds; divisions with negative value will be cross-subsidized and be able to secure disproportionate funds, and inghting between headquarters and divisions and across divisions will lead to losses, and increase the misalignment of managerial incentives.
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Thus, the large majority of the contributions in the academic discussion seems to agree on the following insurance-agency trade-o: the internal capital market oers in principle a valuable coinsurance facility, but conglomerates are exposed to more rent-seeking, conicts of interest and other forms of agency costs than comparable focused rms. Substantial controversy subsists as to the relative importance of the two sides of the trade-o, i.e. whether internal capital markets should be regarded as principally an inecient or a rather benign aair.
But the insurance-agency trade-o theories lead to the following puzzle.
They suggest that the relative value of conglomeration should increase asnancial conditions worsen. This prediction should be supported by both sides of the trade-o: First, on the agency side, if less nancial resources are available relative to investment opportunities or liquidity needs, then there is less discretion and resources for squandering, rent-seeking or inecient cross-subsidies.
Second, on the insurance side, the more nancially constrained a rm is, the more valuable should be the internal capital market, since the rm is more severely restricted to raising funds externally. The problem is that this clear implication appears to be contradicted by recent empirical evidence: Lins and Servaes (2000) show that the conglomerate discount is actually steeper in poorly developed emerging markets. And Claessens et.al. (1999b) nd that during the 1998 Asian nancial crisis, the conglomerate discount in the Asian markets rose, rather than showing signs of a decrease.
Our paper argues that the coinsurance function of internal capital markets in itself can provide for an alternative explanation of the downside of conglomeration. Namely, an internal capital market will indeed create positive spillovers, by pooling and channeling liquidity to high-q divisions with insucient internally generated funds. This is just the upside emphasized by the insurance-agency trade-o theories. But at the same time, liquidity pooling is likely to be ex- 4 . See Meyer et.al. (1982) , Rajan et.al. (2000) , Scharfstein and Stein (2000) , Inderst and Mueller (2001) . These predictions seem to be borne out by empirical work by Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (2000) who show that conglomerates capital expenditure is less sensitive to their q than that of stand-alone rms, and by Rajan et.al. (2000) who show that conglomerates with more heterogeneity across divisions are more heavily discounted.
posed to a negative externality of illiquidity: if one division is hit by a severe shortfall of funds, it is likely to drain away resources from high-q divisions. These healthy high-q divisions would be perfectly insulated from the illiquidity event,
and could self-nance their good projects, if only they had stayed independent.
In a conglomerate, divisions are exposed to nancial contagion from anywhere within the wide connes of the diversied rm, as the narrow nancial rewalls around each division have been dismantled.
To provide more insight into how our trade-o works, suppose two divisions of a conglomerate are independently exposed to the risk of a liquidity shortage at an intermediate period. If this liquidity shortage is mild, it can be overcome by using the free nancial resources earned elsewhere in the conglomerate. Crosssubsidization is likely to be benign. But suppose the shortage is severe, and exceeds the free liquidity resources. The conglomerate still needs to provide the money, or else its creditors may threaten to foreclose and liquidate the entire company. Additional cash resources are needed, which are likely to squeeze on worthy investments elsewhere. Then, the liquidity shortfall becomes contagious.
5
Our insurance-contagion model makes two contributions to the analysis of internal capital markets. First, on a theoretical level, this model suggests that in order to understand the costs associated with internal capital markets, one needs to look no further than the nancial spillovers of the liquidity insurance motive itself. No detour to increased agency costs or exacerbated rent-seeking activities is needed. Second, on an empirical level, our model predicts that as liquidity conditions worsen, conglomerates are likely to do worse than stand-alone rms, and not better, as the insurance-agency models imply.
Our basic result is, therefore, that rms will only benet from conglomeration if the positive spillover of ecient liquidity cross-subsidies outweighs the negative spillover of contagious illiquidity. A deterioration of the nancial conditions of a rm or, equivalently, of the nancial environment of the rm, say due to a nancial crisis or credit crunch, is likely to mean that contagion scenarios become more important relative to insurance scenarios. As a result of such a deterioration, the value of a conglomerate would go down, and not up, in line with empirical ndings by Claessens et.al. (1999a,b) and Lins and Ser-5. Even if the distressed division is a separately incorporated rm, it will not be possible in many cases to shut it down or spin it o without a nancial fallout to headquarters in excess of the pure equity loss in the division; frequently enough, liquidation or asset sale of the ailing division will take time, time during which creditors to the conglomerate will exert extreme caution in taking on new nancial commitments.
vaes (2000) . Taking the insurance-agency trade-o into account, the choice of conglomeration exhibits a fundamental non-monotonicity: rms at the top end and the bottom-end of a performance spectrum will choose to stay independent, whereas rms in the middle range will merge into conglomerates, as they are the most likely to benet from the positive coinsurance eect.
We consider two extensions. First, how is the trade-o aected as we move from totally diversied conglomerates (very dierent industries, independent markets) to conglomerates with more correlation in their activities? We nd that an increase in correlation will diminish the positive insurance eect of conglomeration. But, rather surprisingly, more correlated divisions will also mean that the contagion risk is reduced. This is because the unconditional probability of states of nature where divisions have asymmetric interim cash ows decreases as their correlation increases.
Second, we investigate the optimal scope of a conglomerate. As more divisions are added, it is more likely that the portfolio of divisions has a mixed interim result, with good and bad performers. Whether the conglomerate benets from an increase in scope, depends on whether the most probable of these mixed scenarios comes down on the good side (insurance still possible) or bad side (contagion starts to spread) of the trade-o, which is ultimately a question of the quality of the rm portfolio that the conglomerate holds.
Our paper is closely related to earlier theory literature on internal capital markets and themes visited there., emphasizing both the insurance motive and the agency costs. In particular, our paper belongs to a recent strand of literature where the conglomeration discount is not explained by an internal capital market destroying resources, but because poorly performing rms will prefer to become part of a conglomerate organization. Also, coinsurance against liquidity risks as the main benet of internal capital markets has been investigated earlier. With regard to these two points, we are close notably to Inderst and Mueller (2001) and to Fluck and Lynch (1999) . A number of proposals have been made how conglomerates increase agency costs, where Gautier and Heider (2001) propose an intriguing model. The contribution of our paper to this literature is the contagion risk as the ip side of liquidity coinsurance.
We believe our paper to be of particular relevance to conglomerates in emerging markets, where the fear of sudden shocks on the liquidity provision by external markets are much more common and important, and thus internal capital markets play a particular role in providing insurance in these moments of crisis. The paper is organized as follows. A simple example is developed in Section 2.. The model is laid out in Section 3.. In Section 4., the basic analysis is performed and the non-monotonicity of the conglomeration decision is discussed.
Section 5. looks at extensions. In Section 6., empirical implications are derived.
Section 7. concludes.
A Numerical Example
The following simple numerical example may be helpful to understand the mechanics of the insurance-contagion trade-o. We have deliberately constructed this example to dier from some model assumptions below, to emphasize that the contagion eect does not hinge on the specic incomplete contracts set-up explored below. In particular, in this example, all cash ows are assumed to be veriable, including the payos at the end of the game. Also, the example omits a number of important elements of our model, like eort taking.
Suppose there are two identical divisions A and B. Each earns R 1 in t 1 , where R 1 is 0 with probability 1/2 or 50 euros with probability 1/2, and R 1 is i.i.d. distributed. Each division also has the opportunity to make another gain of R 2 = 30 euros in t 2 , but only if it invests I = 15 euros in t 1 .
Initially, each division has a debt of D = 50 due in t 1 . If organized as a stand-alone rm, each division can raise 30 euros in t 1 by pledging the gain R 2 . Now if R 1 = 50, then the rm has up to 50 + 30 = 80 euros at its disposal in t 1 , including the new credit raised against R 2 . This is enough to pay back D and nance the investment. If R 1 = 0 on the other hand, then the rm has only 0 + 30 = 30 at its disposal in t 1 , which is not enough even to pay back D. So the rm is bankrupt in t 1 . Its expected equity value is The magnitude of the cash ow received in t 2 depends on some unobservable eort that the entrepreneur provides between periods t 0 and t 1 . If the entrepreneur provides low eort, then is equal to its standard level, which we denote by R 2 . There is no cost of eort in this case. If the owner expends high eort, at a non-pecuniary disutility of b, then a xed amount of M is added to the t 2 -cash ow, which will then be R 2 + M .
The uncertain return R 1 of rm A and of rm B is independently distributed (relaxed in Section 5.1.). We denote the net rm value to the entrepreneur, net of her eort costs, by V S ,
The superscript S denotes a stand-alone rm, and the value is the same for rm A and B. We assume that R 2 ≥ R H . This assumption captures the idea that R 2 represents the entire continuation payo of the project after the point has passed where the project could be credibly stopped (in t 1 ). It assures that the entrepreneur will always prefer continuation over reneging.
We assume that
making the provision of eort socially desirable. We also make the assumption that
If this benchmark condition is satised, the project is worthwhile undertaking, provided there is no threat of liquidation, even if no eort is exerted.
At the beginning of t 0 , before writing nancial contracts, the two entrepreneurs have the option to merge their operations into a single diversied rm, which we also call a conglomerate, rather than remain two separate stand-alone rms. In Only the court can liquidate, and the court will always liquidate the entire rm.
The entrepreneur cannot self-liquidate the rm.
9 The liquidation value in t 2 is 6. This assumption implies that the joint surplus V C −(V A +V B ) will be split equally between the two shareholders, since V A = V B in our symmetric model. Note that the level of the joint surplus is determined as the Nash equilibrium outcome in our simple game of eort decisions. 7. Since we will refer to a single investor below, we note that there would be no dierence if we allowed funding by several investors, as long as those investors would renegotiate eciently. 8. Similarly the model by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and others. For example, this could be the case because the entrepreneur has the discretion to report that no cash ow was earned and if no court of law can enforce any contractual repayment higher than the reported cash ow. 9. We assume this on the grounds that liquidation typically takes time, which makes selfliquidation ineective in our setting as a tool to enforce that cash is disgorgea to investors. More precisely, self-liquidation is meaningless if the following is assumed: rst, suppose equal to zero, implying that it is impossible to enforce any contractual payment to investors in t 2 . Therefore, nancial contracts nancing I are only possible if a sucient repayment to investors can be guaranteed out of t 1 -returns. The threat of liquidation in t 1 is a means to entice voluntary repayment in t 1 and to enable funding in the rst place, but it comes at a considerable cost since the project is ended prematurely. In our setting, the only feasible nancial contracts are debt contracts since repayment cannot depend on the realization of R 1 or R 2 .
The optimal debt contract, on which our analysis below is built, will carry out as little actual liquidation as needed, just as in Bolton-Scharfstein (1990 , 1996 .
We choose this contractual setting since it allows for a simple representation of the debt overhang problem: investors will be reluctant to reduce claims in the short-term where enforcement is easy if they know that enforcement in the long-term will be impossible.
Prior to carrying out a liquidation threat, renegotiation is possible. We make the simple assumption that the investor can make a take-it-or-leave-it oer to alter the initial contract, and the entrepreneur then accepts or rejects the oer.
Likewise, if the rms form a conglomerate, then the two entrepreneurs rst agree on their response according to the simple bargaining formula laid out above, and then communicate their agreement as an acceptance/rejection of the investor's
proposal. This assumption implies that the investor has all the bargaining power when renegotiating. This extreme distribution of the bargaining power simplies the analysis, but is not needed for our results.
The timing of the game is summarized in Figure 1 . , L is only earned in t 2 . Second, it is not veriable whether the entrepreneur actually proceeds with liquidation or not. No contract relying on self-liquidation of the entrepreneur can then see liquidation proceeds transferred to the investor before t 2 , at a time when the entrepreneur has no incentives to make any payment to the investor since it is now too late to trigger liquidation as an eective punishment. 4 .
Analysis
In this Section, we analyze the equilibrium of the model with the aim to compare the outcome for the rms as stand-alone entities and as a conglomerate.
We nd that this comparison depends essentially on the depth or severity of the liquidity shock in t 1 . For this reason, we proceed as follows: we will investigate successively the three cases for R L that give rise to markedly dierently outcomes, which we call low, substantial, and severe liquidity risks. With these building blocks in place, we will introduce uncertainty about R L and look at the ex ante choice of rm organization.
benchmark: projects with low liquidity risks
Here, we consider projects where the risk of a liquidity shock is so small that there is no role for a liquidity insurance function. This is the case, as we will argue, when R L > L, and we call this the low liquidity risk case.
We rst look at the scenario where the two rms remain incorporated as stand-alone rms. We begin the analysis with an even simpler case: if R L > I, then the rm is rich enough to pay back a sucient amount to the investor in all contingencies, even after a liquidity shock. In this case, the following debt contract guarantees a riskfree zero return for the investor: the investor has a xed claim worth D = I payable in t 1 . This debt contract is also the optimal contract, since repayments can only be enticed in t 1 , and since the repayment cannot depend on R
1 . This contract implies that the investor has the right to trigger liquidation in t 1 in the event of default.
We rst verify that in this case, the entrepreneur will voluntarily repay the full claim D = I, which is always possible since the t 1 -proceeds exceed the debt claim I. When repaying in full, the entrepreneur keeps
When the entrepreneur defaults, the investor will always trigger liquidation: the liquidation proceeds L are then paid to the investor until she has received full compensation, R 2 is lost and the entrepreneur gets only R 1 in total. Thus, voluntary repayment is preferable since I < R H < R 2 . Renegotiation after default would only avoid liquidation if the entrepreneur pays at least D = I to the investor, but the investor, endowed with all the bargaining power, would extract even more than that. So the entrepreneur has every reason to avoid default.
The entrepreneur's incentive to take eort is easily checked. The incentive condition for the owner to choose the high eort is then, using D = I:
which can be rewritten as b < M and is satised by our assumption (1) that b < qM. Next, we turn to the case of a slightly stronger liquidity shock, i.e.
where L < R L < I. In this case, the cash ow R L is insucient to guarantee a sucient return to the investor. If R L is realized, then the non-veriability of returns R 1 and R 2 , however, implies that the only hope to get any return higher than zero resides in the liquidation right of the outside investors in the event of default. If liquidated, the investor receives L, and the owner gets a t 1 -return of R L . The investor, however, will make a renegotiation oer (take-it-or-leave-it oer): since she has all bargaining power, she will propose to lower her debt claim to R L < D. The entrepreneur will accept: she will keep only R L when she declines (she is then in default, and the investor will prefer liquidating and receiving L to not liquidating and receiving nothing) but get R 2 > R L when accepting the oer. Thus, liquidation will be avoided.
Now debt is no longer riskfree, and the face value of debt D ≥ I paid in the good state must be such that the investor expects to break even,
The eort decision of the owner is determined by the incentive condition
which is again identical to b < M (and satised by condition (1)). Entrepreneurial eort is thus always ensured when the liquidity risk is low. The entrepreneur receives then a net value equal to the rst-best value,
where the subscript l refers to low liquidity risk.
We now consider that both rms have decided to merge, and A and B become divisions of a joint rm, the conglomerate. We investigate the case where R L > L, i.e. we consider both regions of a mild liquidity shock in one step. In this case, each of the divisions, as a stand-alone rm, was perfectly capable of overcoming the liquidity shock. Clearly, the conglomerate would add nothing in this respect, as its advantage lies in the possibility to insure liquidity shocks for which a standalone rm lacks the resources.
There is an important dierence, however, concerning eort incentives. In a stand-alone rm, each owner was reaping the full benet of her eort decision, whereas in the conglomerate the benets are shared, for the parties bargain ex post on the splitting of the unveriable revenues on which no ex-ante contract can be written. Since the entrepreneurs now share their surplus ex post, the payo depends on their joint eort choices. Testing for a high eort (Nash) equilibrium in eort choices, suppose that the entrepreneur controlling the other division chooses high eort. An entrepreneur would then expect the following payo:
As in a stand-alone rm, if 10 which is in contradiction to assumption (1). So rms cannot be induced to take the high eort level, and the only Nash equilibrium is where both opt for the low eort level. This is very intuitive: the conglomerate combines the return of both projects into a single cash ow which is split equally ex post, introducing a kind of corporate socialism and weakening individual eort incentives. As a result, the eort cost can only be half as high as in the case of stand-alone rms.
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We use the superscript V C to denote the net value of the conglomerate, which is always taken to be in a low-eort equilibrium. Let V C l denote the value when liquidity risks are low. The overall value of one of the partner's 50% stake in 10 . The entrepreneur's payo, when deviating to low eort, is
The incentive condition for high eort can then be simplied as b ≤ 11. This eect does not depend on the specic assumption of our model, but would come out of any model where merging means that individual performance can only imperfectly be tracked within the overall performance of the conglomerate. But clearly, the eect is rather strong here since the partners can only negotiate ex post how to split their joint revenue.
the conglomerate is:
If the liquidity risk is low, R L > L, then the entrepreneurs are better o to incorporate as stand-alone rms.
Merging creates only a cost in form of weakened eort incentives, but no benet since the liquidity insurance function of the conglomerate is not needed. This is true at least as long as our assumption concerning disutility of eort holds; if this condition was violated, the entrepreneurs would be indierent, but never strictly prefer a conglomerate.
insurable liquidity risks
We now turn to situations where the liquidity shortfall is potentially severe Since the owner cannot pledge any of her t 2 -return, liquidation is unavoidable.
But even if the arrival of a liquidity shock will trigger liquidation, the entrepreneur's incentives to take the high eort are as before, as:
which always holds by assumption (1). Thus, the entrepreneur always exercises high eort. As for the net rm value, we know that with probability q, R H is earned in t 1 and the rm is continued, adding R 2 + M in t 2 . With probability
L is earned and the rm is liquidated, for an additional liquidation value of L. Of these cash ows, the investor receives a slice with an initial value of I.
Thus,
where the subscript i refers to insurable liquidity shocks.
Next, we consider a conglomerate for the case of We test again for a high eort equilibrium. The entrepreneur's payo in case high eort is provided is (assuming that the other entrepreneur also takes high eort):
The conglomerate will escape liquidation in t 1 only if at least one rm has a return of R H . This condition is taken into account, in the last term on both sides.
When we compare (5) to the payo if the entrepreneurs reverts to low eort, 12 we see that the condition for eort-taking is the same, b
is always violated by assumption (1). The only Nash equilibrium will be with low eorts, and the value of a conglomerate exposed to a substantial liquidity shock is:
12. This payo is: 2 , compared to a probability of 1 − q for stand-alone rms. On the other hand, eort incentives are weakened because only the merged surplus can be divided; thus, given our sustained assumption about the level of b, conglomerate rms can only implement the low eort, while stand-alone rms take the high eort option. A genuine incentives-insurance trade-o emerges, which is the trade-o emphasized in our paper.
We note rst that if the condition b
M 2 did hold and the high eort levels were feasible, then the conglomerate solution would be strictly preferred as it oers an insurance advantage: the only dierence is with respect to the probability to continue into t 2 . This probability is strictly lower for a conglomerate, which will only face liquidation when both divisions simultaneously
and V
S i shows that:
If the liquidity risk is substantial,
the owners are always better o by forming a conglomerate if
The condition when conglomerates would be preferred is straightforward.
The benet of conglomeration is the dierence between continuation value and liquidation value, R 2 − L, times the increment in the continuation probability that a conglomerate oers, q(1 − q). This benet must be larger than the value loss from the lacking eort, qM − b, to make conglomeration an attractive decision.
uninsurable liquidity risks
We nally consider the case where R L < 2L − R H . We will call this a severe liquidity shock.
Consider again a stand-alone rm. It turns out that the outcome will be the same as in the case of a substantial liquidity shock. Albeit the loss of a liquidity shock is steeper, the rm will be liquidated, guaranteeing the investor a return of L. The steeper liquidity risk will be entirely born by the entrepreneur. The debt claim D > I and eort incentives are the same as before, and the rm value V S u is the same as V S i in (4). The conglomerate will escape liquidation in t 1 only if both rms produce the high return R H . The ex ante probability for continuation is thus q 2 . A standalone rm, by comparison, stands a better chance of survival, as it will always be able to continue if its own return is high, which happens with probability q.
This comparison reveals the working of the debt overhang eect: a conglomerate rm experiences a negative spillover from the liquidity shock of the other rm.
Creditors have now claims in their hands which allow them to liquidate both rms, the one which has a liquidity shortfall as well as the other one which would be perfectly healthy if being alone. Since liquidation guarantees to the creditors a higher payo than they would get under any continuation, there is no room for renegotiation.
13 As a result of this negative spillover, the probability of liquidation is higher for conglomerates (1 −q 2 ) than for stand-alone rms (1 −q).
The entrepreneur's eort incentive constraint can be written as before, and only low eort can be attained in a Nash equilibrium. The value of a conglomerate exposed to a substantial liquidity shock is:
The subscript u refers to uninsurable liquidity shocks. We nd that V C u 2 < V S u in this case, and so for two reasons: First, liquidation in t 1 happens more frequently in a conglomerate, with probability 1−q 2 compared to 1−q 2 for standalone rms. Second, the by now familiar reduction in eort incentives within a conglomerate is an additional source of value loss in a combined rm. Thus, 13 . Renegotiation is not possible as the conglomerate rm can only be liquidated as a whole (no self-liquidation). Thus, without liquidation, R H + R L is the highest possible payout to investors, below the 2L that they get under liquidation. If, contrary to our assumptions, the entrepreneur could commit to self-liquidate in t 1 and to credibly turn over the liquidation proceeds to investors, then the investor could make the following renegotiation propoal: the face value of debt is reduced to R H + R L + L; then, if the entrepreneurs liquidate a single rm and pay out all their cash to the investor, the debt is settled and the investor cannot trigger liquidation. But this requires that L is indeed received in t 1 ; if the liquidation proceed is only collected and payable in t 2 , no payment larger than
will reach the investor without liquidating the conglomerate.
in this region of projects with a risk of being hit by the most severe liquidity shocks, stand-alone rms will be able to provide better eort incentives. Taking the incentive and the liquidity eect together shows that both favor stand-alone organization. We have shown:
If the liquidity shocks are severe, R
, then rms will prefer to organize as stand-alone rms.
The intuition is that liquidity shocks now are exposed to contagion: even if only one division is concerned originally, the other will be aected indirectly, via debt overhang. Both divisions will have to be shut down, and they would be better o by keeping their insulating shell and staying separate.
uncertainty, firm organization and the diversification discount
We begin by summarizing our ndings so far, concerning the comparison between stand-alone rms and conglomerates, for liquidity shocks of xed size. Overall, we nd the following non-monotonic relationship:
As a function of the payo in a liquidity shock, the preferred rm organization is:
(i) For low liquidity shocks, R L ≥ L, incorporation as stand-alone rms is preferred.
(ii) For substantial liquidity shocks,
(iii) For severe liquidity shocks, R L < 2L − R H , incorporation as stand-alone rms is preferred.
From this starting point, we now consider how rms will initially choose between these two organizational forms, given their expectation of the possible liquidity risks they will face.
For a more realistic comparison, we need to take into account that rms cannot fully anticipate the size of liquidity events at the time they need to decide on their organizational structure. Therefore, we introduce initial uncertainty about the size of R L that rms will be exposed to. We assume that R L is a random variable distributed over the entire interval (0,
. We assume that while liquidity are independently distributed, the size realization of the stochastic liquidity shock is the same for both rms, for example, because the size of the shock is macroeconomic in its nature.
The value of a stand alone rm can then conveniently be written as the probability-weighted sum of the expected value in the three cases in Proposition 1,
Likewise, the value of a conglomerate is the expectation over its the expected value of the same three cases, or
The entrepreneurs will then decide to incorporate as stand-alone rms as long asV
and in light of Proposition 1, the decision obviously depends on how the distribution function is allocated over the three regions studied earlier: if enough probability mass is in the region of substantial liquidity shocks where conglomerates are the preferred choice, and if the condition of Proposition 1 holds, then the entrepreneurs will opt for conglomeration.
We will next discuss how this informal analysis translates into observable measures, namely rm valuations and conglomerate discounts. We consider for this discussion the comparative statics of the probability density function with respect to the optimal choice of rm organization and the eect on rm value.
probability density functions where each element f k (R L ) is second-order stochastically dominated by its successor f k+1 (R L ) along the sequence. Moreover, as-
is, the rst element in this sequence has all its probability mass in the region of uninsurable liquidity shocks, the last has all its probability mass in the zone of low liquidity shocks, and along the sequence, probability mass is gradually shifted towards worse outcomes R L . At some point, there is enough probability allocated in the middle region to make conglomerates preferable. We make the following straightforward observation, which directly translates into testable predictions about the favorite object of study in the internal capital markets literature, the conglomerate discount:
Consider a sequence of probability density functions f
Then along this sequence, the rm value is strictly decreasing.
Proof: See the Appendix.
In fact, within each region and organizational regime, the rm value is strictly increasing in R L . As R L extends over the limit R L = 2L − R H , the rm value of conglomerates experiences a discontinuous jumps reecting the gain in insurability. As it extends beyond R L = L, the value of stand-alone rms experiences a much larger jump. The discrepancy between these two jumps explains the non-monotonicity.
From an empirical point of view, this comparative statics captures crosssectional as well as longitudinal aspects: cross-sectionally, we consider a deterioration of the quality of divisions as we move across conglomerates. In the time series dimension, a deterioration in the p.d.f. of R L is tantamount to a worsening of liquidity supply conditions on external capital markets.
The contribution of our paper to the analysis of conglomerates is to show that the liquidity insurance function very naturally has a ip side: debt overhang may threaten to aect aliated divisions which otherwise would be perfectly healthy.
This explains a non-monotonicity in the choice of organizational form, making the poorest rms prefer to incorporate as stand-alone plays to insulate against this spillover.
At the other end, our analysis provides an explanation for the diversication discount: Only the best rms are secure enough that they can do without the insurance function of internal capital markets, and they can focus on the optimal incentives as the determinant of rm size instead. For less solid rms, the insurance function becomes relevant, and is likely to dominate the loss in incentives. Conglomerates are discounted because only medium-quality rms organize as conglomerates.
Extensions
The basic structure of the model can be suitably extended and made suciently complex to analyze a range of further and related issues. We discuss (i) what happens when there is a correlation between liquidity shocks, and (ii) the scope of the conglomerate.
systematic liquidity shocks
Liquidity shocks take the special form of uncorrelated shocks in our study. This enabled us to focus on the central trade-o, that between diversication and contagious spread of liquidity risks, in a simple fashion. Systematic liquidity shocks, i.e. correlation among individual liquidity risks, are an important concern, as they will change the scope of coinsurance among divisions. The eect is not trivial, though: As rms become more exposed to systematic liquidity risks, the scope for mutual insurance dwindles; but at the same time, the risk of contagion will also diminish, since liquidity shortages are less likely to occur in one rm but not in the other rms within the conglomerate.
A simple modication of our model with two symmetric rms allows to introduce correlated liquidity shocks. We continue to assume that each rm's unconditional probability of receiving R H is q. Conditional on one rm's cash ow being R H , the probability of the other rm earning R H as well is p > q.
Conversely, conditional on one rm earning R L , the probability of the other rm earning R L is r < q, where, from Bayes' rule, r =
(1−p)q 1−q . This implies that the joint probabilities over the four possible outcomes of the t 1 -cash ows proles are, respectively, pq Thus, we can conveniently use ρ as a measure of correlation, and directly proceed to a comparative statics analysis in terms of ρ. The three regions of R L identied earlier remain the same as before. In each region, the eort incentives for the two entrepreneurs are the same as in the uncorrelated case, as the incentive conditions are unchanged. In fact, given the two t 1 -cash ows, the outcome of renegotiation and hence whether there will be continuation or liquidation is the same. Moreover, we know that for stand-alone rms, the analysis and the attainable rm values are the same as in the uncorrelated case, since the rms' marginal probabilities of achieving R H or R L do not depend on ρ.
All we need to investigate then is the impact, in conglomerates, of an increase in ρ on the ex ante probabilities for the four possible realizations of t 1 cash ows. An increase in ρ will increase the joint probability for (R
and reduce the joint probability
Consider then a conglomerate exposed to substantial liquidity shocks,
Compare this to expression (6) to see that V C l (ρ) is always smaller than the conglomerate value if liquidity shocks are uncorrelated, since 2q − pq < 1
Next, consider a conglomerate exposed to severe liquidity shocks, R L < 2L − R H . Its value is:
Comparison with (7) shows that is always larger than the conglomerate value if liquidity shocks are uncorrelated, as pq > q
Reconsidering the analysis of Section 4. with the modied probability structure, we have shown that:
Consider two rms with correlation ρ between their uncertain cash ow distributions. The optimal organizational choice is as follows:
(i) For low liquidity shocks, R L ≥ L, rms will prefer to incorporate as stand-alone organization, and their values do not depend on ρ.
(ii) If the possible liquidity shock is substantial, 2L − R H ≤ R L < L, and if rms prefer to organize as a conglomerate, then the value dierence between stand-alone and conglomerate is larger than in the case of uncorrelated division, and increasing in ρ.
(iii) For severe liquidity shocks, R
, rms will prefer to organize as stand-alone rms, but the value dierence to conglomerates is smaller than in the case of uncorrelated divisions, and decreasing in ρ.
As correlation among rm-specic liquidity risks increases, both the insurance eect, but also the contagion eect is diminishing, and their impact on the trade-o between these two eects is not immediately obvious. 
conglomerate scope
We have so far considered the most basic conglomerate, which consisted of two identical divisions. Nothing stands in principle in the way of involving more rms or more heterogenous rms, in size or quality. We consider only one particular extension of the conglomerate, that of a three-division conglomerate.
Suppose there is a nite number of rms, labelled A, B, C, etc., all being identical and having independently distributed cash ows as described earlier. For each rm, investment, nancing and cash ow are as these have been described before. The rms can either organize as stand-alone rms, in two-division conglomerates or in three-division conglomerates (we do not consider larger unions for simplicity).
Eort incentives are obviously even weaker in a three-division conglomerate than in a two-division conglomerate, so low eort will be the outcome for large and for small conglomerates alike. The ecient choice between two-division conglomerate and three-division conglomerate, therefore, comes down to a comparison of the ex ante probabilities that the rm can continue into t 2 in both cases. The logic of the analysis remains the same as before, but we need to employ a dierent set of thresholds. For in a three-division conglomerate, it may be possible to collectively insure one, two or three, simultaneously arriving, liquidity shocks. The ex ante probabilities in a three-division conglomerate are: q 3 for no liquidity shock hitting any of the rms, 3q 2 (1−q) for exactly one shock, 3q(1 − q) 2 for two shocks and for three shocks it is (1 − q)
) then a three-division conglomerate can insure one or two shocks. Thus, it allows continuation with probability 1 − (1 − q)
3 . By contrast, a two-division conglomerate will only be able to continue with probability 1 − (1 − q)
2 (one shock insurable at most). The larger conglomerate is thus preferable, since there is an additional coinsurance gain from adding another division.
H , then only a single shock can be insured in a three-rm conglomerate. Thus, it allows continuation with probability
H , a two-rm conglomerate will still be able to continue with probability 1 − (1− q)
It is immediate to verify that the former probability is smaller. 
Comparison of (10) to the stand-alone value V S u in (4) gives the condition that the former will be preferred if:
This means that three-rm conglomerates may well lead to a higher value, even if only one shock among the three divisions can be insured. But the conditions are fairly restrictive: q must be high, but not too high, and R 2 − L must be many times larger than M . Stand-alone rms appears to be more plausible in this region. We can summarize our results as:
Consider identical rms with i.i.d. cash ow distributions considering the choice between stand-alone, two-division and three-division conglomerates. Then the optimal organizational choice will be as follows:
(i) For low liquidity shocks, R L ≥ L, rms will prefer to organize as standalone rms.
(ii) In the lower region of substantial liquidity shocks,
rms will prefer to organize as three-rm conglomerates, provided that
(iii) In the upper region of substantial liquidity shocks,
, rms will prefer to organize as two-rm conglomerates, provided that
(iv) For severe liquidity shocks, R
Otherwise, they will prefer to incorporate as stand-alone rms.
In simple words, an increasing severity of liquidity shocks means that the conglomerate size is decreasing at some point, as expected liquidity shortfalls are becoming more serious. In a sense, the choice has become ner, it not only involves the choice between stand-alone or conglomerate, but also between different conglomerate sizes. This naturally extends the non-monotonicity result (Proposition 1) described earlier. As liquidity conditions worsen, rms gradually decreases the optimal scope of their conglomerate. As long as liquidity events are relatively benign, the insurance eect largely dominates, and conglomerates will generally be large. When liquidity events become more threatening, the contagion eect becomes more important, and it is worth to build tighter rewalls around divisions to protect them against negative spillovers.
Empirical Implications
In this Section, we collect testable predictions of our analysis and confront them to the extant empirical evidence on conglomerates, with particular emphasis on conglomerates in emerging markets.
Implication 1: The diversication discount is caused by poor performers being more likely to join conglomerates than good performers, and not because conglomeration makes the rms' performance deteriorate. Conglomerate divisions have a higher incidence of liquidity shortfalls than comparable stand-alone rms.
This prediction, which is closely related to similar arguments by Mueller- Implication 2: With regard to the degree of nancial development, we expect the average conglomerate discount to be relatively large in the most developed markets, to be lower in less developed markets, and stronger again in the least developed markets. Similarly, within a given market, we predict that the best and the poorest performers are incorporated as stand-alone rms, while intermediate rms are organized as conglomerates.
The idea behind the rst prediction is that the degree of nancial development is strongly correlated with the magnitude of expected liquidity shocks. In the most developed markets, there is only a small role for the insurance eect, in intermediate markets, the insurance eect is important, while in the least developed markets, sudden liquidity needs are more likely to be of a severity that leads to contagion. Our non-monotonicity result then implies that business groups will initially be positively correlated with nancial development, and then negatively related. One testable implication of the non-monotonicity prediction is that standalone rms have a larger variance of valuation (compared to the usual sales or asset multiples) than conglomerates, since conglomerates are sandwiched between high-quality stand-alone rms and low-quality stand-alone rms. We are not aware of a directly comparable test of this hypothesis. It seems to be true, however, that a large number of stand-alone rms have a lower valuation than many conglomerates (discussed in Rajan et.al. (2000)). Also, the outliers of rms with very high Tobin's q are predominantly stand-alone rms and not conglomerates (Lang and Stulz (1994) , which seems consistent with our hypothesis.
Implication 3: Our model predicts that conglomerate discounts should be time varying. Periods of low discounts and a trend towards conglomeration are also periods of tight nancial constraints on the capital markets, and periods of high discounts and a trend towards refocusing go together with loose nancial markets conditions. In the onset of a serious nancial crisis, the conglomerate discount is likely to become more severe for discounted conglomerates (prevalence of the 14 . Roughly, 8-10% conpared to 15% or more for developed markets. contagion eect), but it will fall less for conglomerates without a discount (prevalence of the coinsurance eect). Servaes (1996) was the rst to document that conglomerate discounts are exposed to cyclical movements, with very small discounts and a strong conglomerate merger activity in the 70s and the opposite ever since.
15 Consistent with our model, Claessens et.al. (1999b) show that during the Asian nancial crisis 1998, the conglomerate discount was rising for the least developed markets. Implication 4: As for conglomerate scope, our model predicts that large groups (as measured by the number of divisions), will have a smaller discount than smaller conglomerates, since they are constituted of better performing divisions.
There is only very little and very indirect empirical evidence that could be held against this prediction. Lang and Stulz (1994) report a strong drop in value as one moves from stand-alone rms to two-rm conglomerate. They nd no drop in value when moving from two-division conglomerates to three-rm conglomerates. This is at least consistent with our prediction. Even more convincingly, some of their reported results seem to be consistent with the interpretation that the value for larger conglomerates is actually larger. Any satisfactory study of this issue should control for the degree of diversity within a conglomerate, and also for the size of divisions.
Implication 5: With respect to the correlation or degree of diversity between divisions, we predict that in a sample of strongly performing conglomerates (e.g. those trading at a premium), 16 the conglomerate discount should widen as the degree of correlation between divisions becomes larger. The conglomerate discount should be mitigated in a sample of poorly performing conglomerates. 15. The structural break roughly coincides with the stock market's turn from a long bearish into a long bullish market. 16 . Conglomerates trading at a premium constitute around 40% of a typical conglomerate sample, see Rajan et.al. (2000) . 7 .
Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that the a conglomerate's pooling of nancial resources with all its possible benets also contains the explanation of an important downside of internal capital markets, namely that there are no nancial rewalls between divisions and that nancial distress potentially spills over from one division to others. For relatively mild events of nancial distress, the positive or insurance side of pooling, the possibility to channel funds to the most promising divisions, is likely to be more important, but for severe liquidity shocks, the negative or contagion side of pooling becomes more threatening.
This explanation can notably account for some puzzling ndings in the empirical literature, namely why conglomerates would not appear in a better light on nancial markets in the advent of a nancial crisis, why the conglomerate discount is worse in poorly developed nancial markets, and why the tightening of nancial conditions may more adversely aect conglomerates with widely diversied operations than conglomerates with a stronger correlation across division.
In deriving our results, we made a number of assumptions, and it might be interesting to look at their impact in further work. Notably, we considered only rms of equal size and quality to merge into conglomerates. Obviously, the two sides of the pooling of nancial resources point to the possibility of ner modes of arbitrage. For example, stable rms with low risk of illiquidity can naturally oer insurance to poorer performing rms. But a condition for this is that the sheer size of the low-quality divisions is not in turn menacing the high-quality branch. This should frequently mean that the poorer divisions are also smaller in size. There is some evidence for this to happen in practice, as Maksimovic and Phillips (2000) show that the largest divisions tend to be the most productive ones, and as Graham et.al. (2000) show that acquired rms, and not acquirers (who naturally tend to be larger) exhibit substandard valuations.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.
First, inspection shows that for a given regime j ∈ {l, i, u}, the value functions V C j (R L ) and V S j (R L ) are strictly increasing in R L . To nish the proof, we need to show that as R L passes over the thresholds R L = 2L − R H and R L = L, the value functions remain monotonic.
Consider rst a stand-alone rm. Evaluated from below at R L = 2L − R H , its value is
which shows that this function is smooth and monotonic in R 
which is clearly monotonic in R L , and also shows that V
Consider next a conglomerate rm. Evaluated from below at R L = 2L − R H , its value is
Evaluating at the same point from above,
which is strictly larger. Moving to the threshold , we nd when evaluating from above:
which is strictly larger than (13) since R 2 > I > L by assumption. QED.
